A New Silk Road
The Completion of the Trans-Caspian Railway is further strengthening China's economic ties with Europe. But Why is Russia, presumably an ally of Beijing, being excluded?
As the People’s Republic of China has emerged as a global economic powerhouse over the past twenty years, the primary intersect of its foreign policy and economic expansion has become the Belt and Road initiative, which seeks to expand China’s global power through the consolidation and expansion of its economic ties with Europe, Africa, and much of Asia.
While much of Washington’s concern regarding the Chinese Belt and Road has centered around its expansion into the Indo-Pacific and Africa, the ties being built between the European Union and China are of a similar magnitude to concurrent efforts at economic expansion in the Global South.
In March of this year, this reality was confirmed by the completion of the Trans-Caspian Railway, which begins in China, continues through Kazakhstan, and eventually ends in Poland, where it then connects to the larger European freight network. Shipments have already begun between east and west, with shipment times from China to Europe usually being around 40 days.
However, the very nature of this new trans-Caspian route raises some critical questions, particularly as it relates to the Russian Federation. For the past century, Russia and its Trans-Siberian routes have long been the primary nodes for east-west overland freight, something which has always granted Moscow an enhanced degree of geopolitical leverage in the Far East. This new route denies Russia that age-old benefit. Furthermore, this denial is coming from China of all places, a nation often regarded by the West as closely tied into an economic and political bloc with the Russians.
Thus, Russia’s growing economic isolation on the global stage is only being exacerbated by its most important ally. The political ramifications, while subtle, are evident as well. While Kazakhstan and Central Asia in general have long been regarded as integral to the wider Russian sphere of influence, China’s recent moves in the region allude to a concerted effort by Beijing to bring the region under their growing sphere of influence. Russia is most definitely aware, and probably highly concerned, about this encroachment, but their preoccupation in Ukraine and economic dependence on the Chinese severely limit their ability to resist.
The problem of Chinese economic expansion on the Steppe of Central Asia is only set to continue in the coming decades. The Chinese are already in the process of building two additional routes through Kazakhstan which bypass Russia, signaling that China’s quite apparent intention to marginalize the Russians in global trade is a long-term strategic goal of Beijing.
Chinese rail expansion in Central Asia is of crucial importance to understanding the Sino-Russian partnership at large, which often finds itself to be more fragile than many in the West seem to suggest. As its relationship with the West has become irreparably damaged, Russia has most certainly improved its once tenuous ties with the Chinese, and any reversal of this trend in the short-term is fairly unlikely. However, Russia still considers itself to be a “Great Power” with strategic interests and a sphere of influence which ought to be respected by external parties. This was, of course, the most important factor which led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, yet it is not exclusive to that crisis alone.
As the Chinese encroach upon the once Russian-dominated nations of Central Asia, disputes between the two nations become increasingly likely. What is perhaps equally concerning is the concurrent efforts at Chinese economic expansion into Siberia, a region rich in the resources which China desires and conveniently underdeveloped enough to allow for heavy investment by Beijing.
In the Chinese vision of a Beijing-centered world order, it seems that Russia is confined to the status of a junior partner, if even that. The Chinese care not for the territorial, cultural, or political red lines which Vladimir Putin’s regime has long asserted,. Furthermore, Beijing has masterfully taken advantage of the Russo-Ukrainian War to pursue their agenda of making Moscow dependent upon them, the first step in securing Chinese dominance in Siberia, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Russia, with much of the West now against it, has been forced to accept this situation in order to avoid devolving further into a full-fledged pariah state.
It would not be unreasonable to expect that a post-conflict Russia may develop some key concerns and serious grievances with the Chinese. The Russians are clearly insistent on maintaining their status as a Great Power, and the rapid expansion of their supposed Chinese ally presents just as great a threat to that notion as did NATO expansion into the former eastern bloc.
Such assumptions may seem far-fetched, but they present a plausible outcome for Russia if the nation continues to lean further towards Beijing. While Russia will certainly not pivot entirely back to the West as a counter to China, it would be reasonable to expect Russia to re-balance and redefine its relationship with the Chinese in the coming decades. It may very well strengthen its already favorable ties with India as a counter to China, as well as pursue limited reconciliation with the West in regions like the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East where their strategic interests align to a greater degree. For an American government eager at containing China, this could be welcomed with open arms.
Only time will tell how Russia and China interact in the coming decades, but we must remember that in the multipolar world of “Great Powers” which Moscow seeks to promote, it must not pivot in any one direction, but balance itself among all of the world’s other powers in a way which best promotes its interests alone. Like with any other interstate partnership, the Sino-Russian relationship is circumstantial, not permanent.